Excerpt: Key Findings Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hardware and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment. Iraq?s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq...

Excerpt: Key Findings Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable: Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy?s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already?during the Iran-Iraq war?and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have bee...

Excerpt: The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires: ?(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on (1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and oth...

Excerpt: I. BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TRENDS; The objectives underlying Soviet military policies can be described today in much the same way as a decade ago: preserving the security of the homeland maintaining hegemony over eastern Europe and fostering an image of strength in support of a strong foreign policy aimed at expanding Soviet influence.

Excerpt: A Soviet military reconnaissance satellite program appears to be well under way with possibly as many as 12 flights since 1962. the program uses recoverable vehicles launched from tyuratam under the antle of the cosmos series.

Excerpt: Our current estimate of Soviet grain production for FY1976 of 170 million tons falls about 58 million tons short of requirements. The USSR has so far purchased approximately 16 million tons of foreign grain in FY 76. in addition Moscow undoubtedly will draw grain stocks which we believe do not exceed 10-15 million tons and may be considerably less. these tow factors, taken together narrow the difference between available supply and require ments to a minimum of 27 million tons.

Excerpt: MIDDLE EAST

Excerpt: Process and Responsibilities: AID0 will survey previously identified records series that are likely to contain informational, and which have been declassified and released under EO 12958 and previous Executive Orders, to determine if documents containing classified or sensitive informational may have been inadvertently or improperly declassified and released. if AFDO finds classified or sensitive informational in a series of records, AFDO will notify NARA so tha...

Excerpt: The elevation of the archbishop of Poland 's former royal capital and ancient cultural center -- Krakow -- to the papacy will undoubtedly prove extremely worrisome to Moscow, if only because of the responsiveness his papacy is likely to evoke in east European communist societies. the election of a Polish pope, which reflects the uniquely vital Polish church, will make even more difficult Moscow's traditional attempts to bind culturally western Poland more closel...

Excerpt: In pursuing their struggle against the west, the Soviet leaders follow a strategy which they call ''peaceful coexistence.'' by this they declare their intention to wage a persistent and aggressive campaign by a variety of means propaganda and political pressure, military threat, economic and scientific competition, subversion and internal war - aimed at the victory of their of their cause on a world scale.

Excerpt: Discussing Intelligence Community analysts believe that the next decade-following the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks-will likely see long-established military, political, and economic relationships between and among European nations and their superpower partners reevaluated and redefined. CFE is an important element in a larger process of enhanced West European economic integration, the assertion of independent European political interests, and the po...

Excerpt: Discussing; This paper presents the latest assessment of the ongoing unilateral Soviet withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe and reductions in the so-called Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) zone It provides the latest figures of forces withdrawn and reduced, the current understanding of the restructuring of the forces remaining, and the best estimates of the factors affecting the combat capabilities and potential missions of those residual forces. We have reached...

Excerpt: Key Judgments; Implementation of the two-year program of unilateral troop reductions announced by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988 appears to be roughly on schedule. To date, the Soviets have withdrawn a)- most 2,000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic; however, reorganization and modernization in the Western Group of Forces (WGF) will partially offset the resulting reduction in force capabilities. At the end of 1990, the WGF will consis...

Excerpt: Key Judgments Recent political events in Eastern Europe will further erode Soviet confidence in their allies. Moscow can not rely upon non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces; it must question its ability to bring Soviet reinforcements through East European countries whose hostility is no longer disguised or held in check. On the basis of completed unilateral Warsaw Pact cuts without NATO reciprocation and considering current political turmoil, we now believe that the cap...

Excerpt: The problem to estimate the role and capabilities of the Soviet theater forces, especially against the NATO area in Europe, at present and over the next two years or so.

Excerpt: We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be significantly affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Any internal conflicts arising out of such developments would probably be resolved within the confines of the ruling group and the higher echelons of the communist party and would not lead to civil wars or disturbances of major proportions.

Excerpt: THE PROBLEM to estimate capabilities and programs for the development of 700 nautical mile and 1,100 nautical mile ballistic missiles, inter continental ballistic missiles and fleet ballistic missiles, including their major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability.

Excerpt: THE PROBLEM; To assess the scope and nature of Soviet military research and development (R&D), to estimate the types of weapon and space systems likely to emerge from that effort in the next few years, and to discuss factors that will affect the course of Soviet military R&D over the longer term.

Excerpt: NOTE; This paper considers in broad perspective the principal factors which underlie the USSR's external policies at present and its aims and intentions with respect to certain key areas and issues. As such, while it suggests the limits within which Soviet policies are likely to operate, it does not estimate likely Soviet conduct and positions in detail. In view of the intimate interaction between Soviet and American policies, this could not be done in any case ...

Excerpt: The USSR's view of its world position A. Developments of recent years have given the USSR increased confidence in its security and strategic posture, in its capacity engage its adversaries on favorable terms, and in the prospects for the long-term growth of its international influence. The Soviets have thus begun to pursue a more vigorous foreign policy and to accept deeper involvement in many world areas.